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BARGAINING ORDERS FOR EMPLOYER COERCION:
A NEED FOR CONSISTENCY
An employer who violates section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor
Relations Act during a union organizational campaign may be ordered
to bargain upon request. However, depending upon the facts, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board may use either of two distinct methods of
analysis. One line of approach has been evolved in cases where a union
with majority status requests and is denied recognition and the employer
subsequently commits section 8 (a) (1) violations. In Joy Silk Mills, Inc.
v. NLRB,' the Board held that the employer's subsequent course of
section 8(a) (1) conduct is evidence that his prior refusal was designed
to gain time to undermine the union and was, therefore, in bad faith.
By means of this inference the Board was able to base its bargaining
order on a finding that section 8(a) (5) had been violated. In this line of
cases the issue before the courts on appeal is not whether as a matter
of law a bargaining order is the appropriate remedy for the section
8(a) (1) conduct found by the Board, but whether there is substantial
evidence to warrant the Board's factual determination that the em-
ployer's refusal was not in good faith. A second line of analysis has
developed in those cases in which the employer prior to a valid demand
for recognition engages in section 8(a) (1) conduct designed to dissi-
pate the union's majority status.2 Since there is no valid demand, the
Joy Silk section 8(a) (5) argument cannot be availed of to justify a
bargaining order.' Nevertheless, in Caldarera v. NLRB4 the Eighth
Circuit held that if a majority exists at some time the appropriate remedy
under the act for certain section 8(a) (1) conduct designed to dissipate
the majority is an order to bargain. Authority cited in cases considering
the proper remedy for section 8(a) (1) violations establishes that the
Board possesses substantial discretion in fashioning remedies for un-
1. Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), modified, 185 F.2d 732
(D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951). Similar reasoning was used in Inter-
national Union of UAW v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Mid-West
Towel & Linen Serv., Inc., 339 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Philamon Laboratories,
Inc., 298 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962); NLRB v. Decker,
296 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Trimfit of California, 211 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1954).
2. See NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1965); Editorial 'El
Imparcial," Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1960); Piasecki Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB,
280 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961) ; Summit Mining Corp. v.
NLRB, 260 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Caldarera, 209 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1954);
D. H. Holmes Co. v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1950); Texarkana Bus Co. v. NLRB,
119 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1941); Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 611 (1964).
3. Sheboygan Sausage Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1490 (1966).
4. NLRB v. Caldarera, 209 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1954).
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fair labor practices.' Although not all section 8(a) (1) violations war-
rant a bargaining order, since the traditional cease and desist order
will often be a sufficient remedy to restore the status quo,' Caldarera
and subsequent Board and court decisions clearly establish that a bargain-
ing order may be issued solely on the basis of certain section 8(a) (1)
violations.7  In this line of cases, unlike the Joy Silk cases, the ap-
pellate review focuses on the fundamental legal issue of the appropriate-
ness of a bargaining order for a given course of section 8 (a) (1) conduct.
The perplexing question is why this dichotomy in the case law should
exist. Could not the approach taken in the Caldarera line of cases be
applied with equal persuasion in a Joy Silk fact situation? Since the
only factual distinction between the two situations is the presence of a
valid demand prior to the section 8(a) (1) violations in the Joy Silk
situation, it appears that the remedy in each case is attributable directly or
indirectly to the same conduct-the threats, coercion and restraint of em-
ployees. Therefore, it would seem that the same section 8(a) (1) conduct
that results in a bargaining order under Joy Silk through the circuitous
approach of inferring bad faith and thereby establishing a section 8 (a) (5)
violation, would itself warrant a bargaining order under the law of
Caldarera.
Recent Board action indicates a recognition of this fact. In Mock
Road Super Duper, Inc.,8 and other recent decisions,9 the Board has
held it unnecessary to determine whether an employer's conduct violated
section 8(a) (5) of the act. In some of the cases section 8(a) (5)
violations were actually found,10 and in others the facts were such that
section 8(a) (5) violations could have been found by application of the
Joy Silk approach.' By stating that it is unnecessary to determine whether
the employer violated section 8(a) (5), the Board implies that a section
8(a) (5) finding is not a prerequisite for a bargaining order. Moreover,
5. See Frank Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Stowe Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 964 (1955).
6. E.g., Edward Fields, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 754, 759 (2d Cir. 1963), where even
though there was a finding of substantial evidence to sustain the conclusion that the com-
pany committed an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8(a) (1), the court held that
whatever the company may have done to encourage the employees not to look to the
union to represent them, to require it to bargain with this union would be a remedy
going far beyond the necessities of the situation and would disregard the paramount
rights and interests of the employees.
7. Cases cited note 2 supra.
8. 156 N.L.R.B. 983 (1966).
9. Wausau Steel Corp., 160 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (Aug. 19, 1966); Luisi Truck Lines, 160
N.L.R.B. No. 45 (Aug. 16, 1966); Priced-Less Discount Foods, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 95
(March 28, 1966).
10. Luisi Truck Lines, supra note 9; Wausau Steel Corp., supra note 9.
11. Priced-Less Discount Foods, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (March 28, 1966).
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in several cases now pending on review in the courts of appeals the Board
has adopted the practice of arguing in the alternative: (1) that the section
8(a) (1) violations warrant a bargaining order since they establish a
lack of good faith doubt in violation of sections 8(a) (5) and (2) that
the section 8(a) (1) violations, in and of themselves, warrant a bargain-
ing order under the act. 2
Joy Silk and Caldarera are both based upon the premise that if an
employer commits certain section 8 (a) (1) violations during the organiza-
tional period, an order to bargain may be necessary to restore as nearly
as possible the situation that would have obtained but for the section
8(a) (1) conduct. Consequently the outcome of a particular case should
depend upon the conduct involved and not upon the method of analysis
employed. At present, however, this result is not always attained. In
Flomatic Corp."3 the Board found certain violations of section 8(a) (1)
and issued a bargaining order. Applying the argument of Caldarera
the Board held that only a bargaining order could restore as nearly as
possible the situation that would have obtained but for the employer's un-
fair labor practices. Finding that there had been no demand made, the
Board was precluded from finding a section 8(a) (5) violation, i.e.,
precluded from applying Joy Silk's inference of bad faith argument.
On appeal the Second Circuit denied enforcement, holding that a cease
and desist order, not an order to bargain, was the proper remedy for
the section 8(a) (1) conduct.'4 The result in Flomatic should have been
the same regardless of which analysis was applied to the facts. However,
if there had been a request to bargain and the case had come before the
court with the Board relying upon the Joy Silk argument, the scope of
review would have been limited to the factual issue: was there sub-
stantial evidence to sustain the Board's finding of a lack of good faith at
the time of demand. In such case the bargaining order would probably
have been enforced.' 5
12. Brief for Respondent at 32, 33, General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, appeal
pending, 4th Cir., from 157 N.L.R.B. No. 59 (March 11, 1966); Brief for Respondent at
45, 46, National Can Corp. v. NLRB, appeal pending, 7th Cir., from 159 N.L.R.B. No. 66
(June 17, 1966); Brief for Respondent, at 32, 33, Master Transmission Rebuilding Corp. v.
NLRB, 373 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1967).
13. 147 N.L.R.B. 1304 (1964).
14. NLRB v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1965).
15. See NLRB v. Philamon Laboratories, Inc., 298 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962), where it was held that an employer withheld recognition
merely to gain time to dissipate the majority status of the union and had thus violated
§ 8(a) (5). Conduct in violation of § 8(a)(1), very similar to that found in Flomatic,
was held to be substantial evidence of a lack of good faith at the time of demand. In
Flomatic the employer was held to have interfered with the employee's exercise of § 7
rights in violation of § 8(a)(1) by sending a letter to his employees which contained
promises of benefit and invitations to employees to bypass the union and to deal directly
with the employer. The promises included statements concerning a wage raise, vacations
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The Board's approach in the recent cases substantiates what has for
sometime seemed apparent: that the Caldarera principle is applicable
whether or not there has been a demand. The next logical step is to
insure that the question of the right to a bargaining order in any given
case will be governed by the merits, i.e., by the nature of the section
8(a) (1) conduct, and not by the method employed in analyzing the
case. This necessitates an examination of the two approaches and an
abandonment of one in favor of the more rational.
While section 8(a) (1) violations may often be indicative of an
original lack of good faith, an employer's refusal may have been motivated
by a good faith doubt. It is possible that an employer could refuse
to bargain with an honest doubt and yet subsequently commit section
8(a) (1) violations. Of greater concern, however, is the confining effect
that the Joy Silk analysis has upon the courts' scope of review. Whether
the case is argued under Caldarera or Joy Silk, the underlying question
is whether as a matter of law the act authorizes the issuance of a bargain-
ing order for a given course of section 8(a) (1) conduct. The Joy
Silk approach, however, precludes court review of this fundamental
question, and limits the court to the factual issue of whether the Board's
finding of lack of good faith is supported by substantial evidence. 6
Under the Caldarera approach, no fictions need be employed; no
inferences need be drawn. The potential for error inherent in Joy Silk
is therefore non-existent. More importantly, on appeal review is focused
on the critical legal issue common to both lines of cases: whether the act
authorizes a bargaining order for a given course of section 8(a) (1)
conduct.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the courts' acceptance of
the Caldarera principle has expunged the only reason for the existence
of the Joy Silk argument. At one time the Board perhaps felt constrained
by the language of the act to base all bargaining orders upon a section
8(a) (5) finding. However, the recent court decisions affirming the
issuance of section 8(a) (1) bargaining orders have eliminated the need
to perpetuate the fictitious Joy Silk argument. If there is a course of
section 8(a) (1) conduct, regardless of whether there has been a valid
demand, the Board should apply the Caldarera approach and determine
with pay, paid holidays, profit-sharing, pensions, and lay-off and recall provisions. The
§ 8(a)(1) conduct in Philamon consisted of similar promises concerning a pay raise, a
profit-sharing plan, and better grievance procedures.
16. See Master Transmission Rebuilding Corp. v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 402 (9th Cir.
1967) where the court chose to apply the Joy Silk analysis, even though the Board had
presented the alternative arguments; see Brief for Respondent at 32, 33. A bargaining
order was issued but the court did not consider whether the § 8(a) (1) conduct would in
itself warrant such an order.
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whether a bargaining order is authorized under the terms of the act. This
will allow court review of the crucial legal issue, and will thereby insure
consistency and predictability in the remedial process.
